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Article
INNOCENT SPOUSES: A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW TAX LAWS
GOVERNING JOINT AND SEVERAL TAX LIABILITY
LILY KAHNG*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE new innocent spouse laws are rapidly and dramatically reshaping
the contours of joint and several liability for married taxpayers filing
joint returns.' As this process occurs, the new laws should be interpreted
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. A.B., 1980, Princeton
University; J.D., 1984, Columbia Law School; LL.M. (Taxation), 1991, New York
University Law School. The author wishes to thank Sheldon Frankel, Katherine
Pratt, Christopher Rizek, John Siliciano and Gregory Silverman for their helpful
comments.
This Article draws on the author's experiences and research while in the
Office of Tax Legislative Counsel, Department of Treasury. The opinions
expressed in the Article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views
of the Department of Treasury.
1. The level of activity surrounding the innocent spouse laws within the legal
system has been astonishing. During the first year alone after passage of the new
law, then IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti estimated that 27,000 claims for re-
lief under the new law were made. See Amy Hamilton, Lawmakers Track IRS Reform
One Year Later, 84 TAx NOTES 517, 519 (July 26, 1999) (discussing problems with
processing innocent spouse claims). In each of fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001,
the IRS received approximately 50,000 cases. See TAx ADMINISTRATION: IRS's INNO-
CENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED PERFORMANCE MEASURES
NEEDED, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MI-
NORITY MEMBER, S. COMM. ON FIN. tbl. 4 (Apr. 2002), available at http://
www.unclefed.com/GAOReports/99002-558.pdf (showing innocent spouse cases
received and decided by IRS in 1999-2001). During those same years, courts de-
cided dozens of innocent spouse cases. See id. tbls. 7, 8 (noting innocent spouse
cases litigated in Tax Court and circuit courts).
Two unusual features of the 1998 Act's innocent spouse rules account for the
flurry of administrative and judicial activity with respect to the new law. First, the
new law is retroactive: any spouse with an unpaid deficiency as of July 22, 1998,
became eligible to seek relief under the new law. See Internal Revenue Restructur-
ing and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 740 (1998)
(setting effective dates for new innocent spouse provisions). The new law also ap-
plies to liabilities arising afterJuly 22, 1998. See id. Second, the new law requires
the IRS to make determinations quickly and, if a determination is adverse, pro-
vides the taxpayer immediate review by Tax Court review. See id. Taxpayers have
(261)
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and implemented in a manner consistent with a cohesive underlying the-
ory of the tax treatment of married individuals. This Article provides a
framework for such interpretation and implementation. Part II of this Ar-
ticle presents an overview of the current tax law treatment of marriedjoint
filers, under which joint and several liability is imposed unless relief is
available under the new innocent spouse laws. Part III examines the tax
rationales that have traditionally been offered for imposing joint and sev-
eral liability. Part III concludes that the principal rationale for joint and
several liability-marital unity-is little more than a fiction adopted by
lawmakers and scholars in order to rationalize a political compromise be-
tween community property and common law states. Furthermore, the
other, secondary justifications for joint and several liability are unsatisfac-
tory at best. Part IV then explores joint and several liability in other areas
of law such as tort, agency and fraudulent transfer and identifies fairness
and efficiency as the principal policy grounds for imposing joint and sev-
eral liability. Finally, Part V uses these policy criteria of fairness and effi-
ciency to evaluate the current tax law treatment of married joint filers.
Part V recommends that the new innocent spouse laws be interpreted or
reformed to effectuate these policies.
I. CURRENT LAW: JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY;
INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF
A. Joint and Several Liability
At the first level, our federal income tax system is one of self-assess-
ment. A taxpayer is required to report items of income, deduction, gain
and loss on a return and compute her taxable income and the tax
thereon. The taxpayer must sign and file the return, and pay the amount
of tax shown due. 2 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is authorized to
review and challenge the self-assessed tax liability, and through administra-
tive and judicial proceedings, the taxpayer may ultimately be found to be
liable for a deficiency-the difference between the correct tax due and
the amount of tax shown on the return.3 The deficiency may also include
interest charges4 on taxes paid later than their due date and penalties for
failure to self-assess and pay the correct amount of tax due.
5
ninety days to petition the Tax Court for review if the IRS either makes an adverse
determination on a claim for relief or fails to make a final determination within six
months after a claim for relief is made. See I.R.C. § 6015(e) (1) (2003).
2. See I.R.C. §§ 6011 (a), 6151 (a) (2003) (discussing general requirements for
filing income tax returns).
3. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ch. 10 (2d
ed. 1991) (discussing procedures for assessing income tax).
4. See I.R.C. § 6601 (2002).
5. See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6651-6751 (2003).
[Vol. 49: p. 261
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A husband and wife who choose to file a joint federal income tax
return engage in this self-assessment process jointly. 6 The joint return ag-
gregates items of income, deduction, gain and loss attributable to either
spouse; taxable income is computed in the aggregate, and the tax due is a
single amount.7 If a joint return is made, each spouse undertakes to pay
the entire amount of tax shown due. 8 Furthermore, each spouse assumes
joint and several liability for the entire amount of any subsequently deter-
mined deficiency.
9
From a collection standpoint, joint and several liability allows the IRS
to collect from either spouse the full amount of any deficiency. If the IRS
collects the entire amount of a deficiency from one spouse, that spouse
6. See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2003) (authorizing joint returns for married taxpay-
ers). Married couples may choose either to file a joint return or to file separate
returns. See id. As a practical matter, most married couples file jointly. See INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION 1304, STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1993 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURNS 80 (1996) (charting returns by
marital status). In 1993, an estimated 96.3% of all married couples filed jointly.
See id. Most married taxpayers file jointly because it is simpler, it rarely results in a
higher tax liability and it often results in a lower tax liability than filing separately.
See Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the
Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13J.L. & POL. 241, 261-73 (1997) (discussing differ-
ences between joint and separate filing). The tax benefits of filing jointly derive
primarily from the rate structures governing joint and separate filers. See id.
The option to file ajoint return for married couples was introduced in 1918,
shortly after the introduction of the income tax in 1913. See Richard C.E. Beck,
The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should Be Re-
pealed, 43 VAND. L. REv. 317, 333 (1990) (discussing origins ofjoint return liabil-
ity). For a detailed history of the joint return and joint and several liability, see id.
at 332-47 (surveying history ofjoint return liability) and Amy C. Christian, Joint and
Several Liability and the Joint Return: Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REx,. 535,
538-72 (1998) (surveying history ofjoint return liability) [hereinafter Christian I].
7. See I.R.C. § 6013(d) (3) (2003); Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(b) (2003).
8. See I.R.C. § 6013(d) (3).
9. See id. A joint return is required to be signed by both spouses. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6013-(1) (a) (2) (2003). If a spouse fails to sign the return, it may be found
to be an invalid joint return, and joint and several liability will not attach. See
Carrick v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 938, 942 (1991) (declining to assess liability
against non-signing spouse); cf Brown v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 116, 120-21 (1968) (de-
clining to assess liability for spouse who signed return under duress). However,
failure to sign a return is not dispositive; rather, the intention of the parties is
determinative. SeeNoonan v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1740, 1743 (1997) (hold-
ing ex-wife liable despite her refusal to sign joint return she consented because of
previous contractual agreement); Hoyle v. Comm'r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1321, 1332-
33 (1994) (finding insufficient evidence of intended joint return when husband
signed spouse's name).
A joint return is also invalid if a spouse signed under duress. See, e.g., Brown,
51 T.C. at 119 (finding no joint return when spouse's signature executed under
duress). Establishing duress has proved burdensome, and taxpayers often fail. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 555, 562-63 (1966) (holding that despite fear of
husband, spouse's signature was not made under duress); Federbush v. Comm'r,
34 T.C. 740, 757 (1960), affd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that
despite testimony that husband was abusive, spouse's signature was not made
under duress); Estate of Aylesworth v. Comm'r, 24 T.C. 134, 146 (1955) (holding
that despite marital difficulties, spouse's signature was not made under duress).
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has contribution fights against the other spouse for the portion of the
deficiency attributable to the other spouse.' 0 In situations like this, little is
known about the extent to which contribution rights are actually pursued
or lead to recovery. Nevertheless, the IRS often pursues one spouse rather
than the other because prospects of recovering from the other spouse are
poor (e.g., the other spouse is judgment-proof, has no attachable income
stream or the other spouse's whereabouts are unknown).' I From this, one
can surmise that the enforcement of contribution rights against this other
spouse occurs relatively rarely.
1 2
B. Innocent Spouse Relief
1. Pre-1998 Law
Under certain circumstances, a spouse may be relieved from liability
arising from a joint return she has signed. The first statute providing for
this so-called innocent spouse relief was enacted in 1971.13 Prior to its
repeal in 1998,14 it authorized the IRS to relieve a spouse from joint and
several liability for a deficiency if three conditions were met: (1) there was
10. See, e.g., Murchison v. Murchison, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285, 288 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (upholding contribution rights regarding obligations from joint return);
Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 282-83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (recogniz-
ing contribution rights of spouse regarding obligations from joint returns); see also
Beck, supra note 6, at 331 (discussing contribution); Richard C.E. Beck, The Inno-
cent Spouse Rules, 15 FAM. ADvoc. 30, 32 (Fall 1992) (discussing protections against
tax liability arising from joint returns).
11. See Kari Smoker, Comment, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998: Expanded Relief for Innocent Spouses-At What Cost? A Feminist Perspective,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045, 2063 (1999) (discussing problems arising from joint and
several liability from joint tax returns).
12. See Richard C.E. Beck, The Deductibility of a Worthless Right to Contribution for
Joint Income Taxes: The Mistaken Line of Cases Under Rude v. Commissioner, 9 VA.
TAx REv. 313, 314-15 (1989) (noting worthlessness of contribution rights).
13. See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063
(1971). The 1971 statute was enacted to address cases like Scudder v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967), rev'd and remanded, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1969). In that
case, Frank Scudder embezzled hundreds of thousands of dollars from a wholesale
liquor business owned by his wife, Louise Scudder, and her sisters. See id. at 37.
Frank failed to report the embezzled income on theirjoint return. See id. at 37-38.
The Tax Court reluctantly held Louise jointly and severally liable for the defi-
ciency, decrying the harsh result and suggesting the need for legislation. See id. at
41. When Congress finally enacted the innocent spouse statute, the legislative his-
tory cited Scudderas a reason for the change in law. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 2
(1970) (noting several innocent spouse cases and quoting from Scudder). The stat-
ute was significantly modified in 1984 and, until its repeal in 1998, remained in
effect in substantially the same form. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 494, 801-03 (1984) (amending innocent spouse
laws).
14. See I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1998) [hereinafter Old § 6013(e)], repealed by Inter-
nal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat.
685 (1998).
264
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a "substantial understatement" 15 of tax attributable to "grossly errone-
ous" 16 items of the other spouse; 17 (2) the spouse requesting relief estab-
lished that, in signing the return, she did not know, and had no reason to
know, of the substantial understatement;18 and (3) taking into account all
the facts and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold the requesting
spouse liable for the deficiency attributable to the understatement.1 9
Most of the cases interpreting the "knowledge" requirement of the
statute focused on the "reason to know" rather than the "knowledge" com-
ponent.20 In determining whether the reason-to-know requirement had
been met, courts generally conducted a multi-factor inquiry that included:
(1) the level of education of the spouse seeking relief; (2) her involvement
in family finances and business affairs; (3) the presence of lavish or extrav-
agant expenditures; and (4) the extent to which the other spouse was de-
ceitful or evasive with regard to family finances.2 1 If a spouse knew, or had
15. See Old § 6013(e)(1)(B). An understatement is generally defined to be
the difference between the correct amount due and the amount of tax shown on
the return. See Old § 6013(e); see also I.R.C. § 6662(d) (2) (A) (2003).
There were two components to the definition of substantial understatement.
The first required the understatement to exceed $500. See Old § 6013(e)(3). The
second required that, if the understatement related to a deduction, credit or basis,
it exceed a percentage of the requesting spouse's adjusted gross income for the
year before the notice of deficiency was mailed, 10% for an adjusted gross income
of up to $20,000 and 25% for an adjusted gross income greater than $20,000. See
Old § 6013(e) (4).
16. See Old § 6013(e) (1) (C). A grossly erroneous item was an omission from
gross income or a deduction, credit or basis for an amount in which there was no
basis in law or in fact. See Old § 6013(e) (2). The "no basis in law or fact" was
undefined in the statute and led to inconsistent and confusing results in the
courts. See Jerome Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief: A Call for Legislative and Judicial
Liberalization, 40 TAx LAw. 819, 842-60 (1987) (discussing cases interpreting "no
basis in law or fact" clause).
17. See Old § 6013(e)(1)(D). When an erroneous item is related to services
performed or property owned by one spouse, it is generally treated as that spouse's
item. See Keene v. Comm'r, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 553, 555-56 (1979) (finding hus-
band liable for omitted income earned by and allocated to him, even though wife
prepared return). The courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that, in
order to qualify for relief, the erroneous item must be solely allocable to the other
spouse. See id. at 555. Thus, when an item is related to activities of both spouses or
property owned by both spouses, the item is allocated to both spouses and the
spouse seeking relief is denied relief. See Hayman v. Comm'r, 992 F.2d 1256, 1260-
61 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying relief to wife after allocating erroneous deductions
made jointly by husband and wife to both spouses).
18. See Old § 6013(e)(1)(C).
19. See Old § 6013(e)(1)(D).
20. This is probably true for two reasons. First, determining whether a spouse
had "reason to know" is the sort of facts-and-circumstances finding that parties can
reasonably debate. In contrast, whether a spouse has knowledge of an erroneous
item is difficult to prove or disprove. Second, all that is necessary to disqualify a
spouse from relief was a finding that she met the less stringent "reason to know"
standard.
21. SeeReserv. Comm'r, 112 F.3d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating standard
of inquiry in joint return liability cases); Resser v. Comm'r, 74 F.3d 1528, 1535-36
(7th Cir. 1996) (stating standard for evaluating whether taxpayer had reason to
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reason to know, some but not all of an understatement, courts allowed
partial relief to be granted.22 Courts consistently interpreted the knowl-
edge requirement to mean that the spouse knew, or had reason to know,
of the existence of an erroneous item, not of its correct tax treatment. 23
In determining whether the "equity" requirement of the statute was
satisfied, courts tended to place great weight on whether the spouse seek-
ing relief significantly benefited from the understatement. 24 This is con-
know); Kistner v. Comm'r, 18 F.3d 1521, 1525 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (discussing test for
"reason to know" in joint return liability cases); Pietromonaco v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d
1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing objective standard for "reason to know" in
joint return liability cases); Hayman, 992 F.2d at 1261 (discussing relevant inquiry
in joint return liability cases); Stevens v. Comm'r, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir.
1989) (discussing "reason to know" standard in innocent spouse test). In some
cases, courts have articulated the "reason to know" standard as whether a reasona-
bly prudent taxpayer in his or her position could be expected to know that the
stated tax liability was erroneous or that further investigation was warranted. Pie-
tromonaco, 3 F.3d at 1345 (using "reasonably prudent taxpayer" standard); Stevens,
872 F.2d at 1505 (applying standard of whether "a reasonably prudent taxpayer
under the circumstances of the spouse at the time of signing the return could be
expected to know that the tax liability was erroneous or that further investigation
was warranted"); Silverman v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2631, 2634 (1994) (not-
ing that taxpayer is liable if "a reasonably prudent person in his or her position
could be expected to know that the stated tax liability was erroneous or that fur-
ther investigation was warranted"). See generally Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses,
Reasonable Women and Divorce: The Gap Between Reality and the Internal Revenue Code, 3
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 449-57 (1996) (discussing factors considered by courts
in determining "reason to know" in joint return liability disputes).
22. SeeWiksell v. Comm'r, 90 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1996) (allowing partial
relief to spouse who had no reason to know of magnitude of understatement);
Ballard v. Comm'r, 740 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1984) (allowing relief to spouse for
joint return omissions despite her knowledge of related items); Ratana v. Comm'r,
662 F.2d 220, 224-25 (4th Cir. 1981) (allowing partial relief from liability to spouse
with knowledge of some omissions but no reason to know of others); see also Laura
Lee Mannino, Note, Breaking the Taxing Bonds of Marriage: Partial Relief for the Inno-
cent Spouse, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 477, 494-501 (1997) (discussing partial relief in
joint liability actions).
23. See Reser, 112 F.3d at 1265 (inquiring whether spouse "knew or should
have known of income-producing transaction"); Bokum v. Comm'r, 992 F.2d 1132,
1131 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e refuse to find that spouses who are mistaken about
the operation of the tax law are nevertheless released from liability."); Stevens, 872
F.2d at 1504-05 (analyzing whether spouse "knew or had reason to know" of
"phony deductions," not whether spouse knew the law); Sanders v. United States,
509 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1975) (examining whether spouse knew or had reason
to know of erroneous transaction); McCoy v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972)
(finding no relief from liability when lack of knowledge was "predicated on mere
ignorance of the legal tax consequences of transactions"); see also Paul F. Wright,
Comment, Taxation-Innocent Spouse Provision-Of Erroneous Deductions and Deci-
sions-From 6013(e) to 6015-The Knowledge Requirement and the Erroneous Deduction
Quagmire of the Internal Revenue Code, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 845, 859-62 (1998) (discuss-
ing "knowledge of the transaction" test); Courts Split over "Knowledge" of Innocent
Spouses, 72 J. TAx'N 314, 314-15 (Jacquin D. Bierman & Steven L. Severin eds.,
1990) (discussing court decisions requiring either knowledge of transaction or
knowledge of tax consequences of transaction).
24. See Buchine v. Comm'r, 20 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing most
important factor in equity test as whether taxpayer benefited significantly from tax
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sistent with the 1984 legislation, which deleted the reference to significant
benefit from the statute, but directed in legislative history that significant
benefit continue to be taken into account.25 Other factors taken into ac-
count included whether the other spouse deserted the spouse seeking re-
lief and whether the spouses are divorced or separated. 26
2. 1998 Act
a. Prior Law Liberalized
The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
199827 (the "1998 Act") changed the innocent spouse provisions in several
significant respects. 28 The 1998 Act liberalized the prior-law relief provi-
sion ("traditional relief") by eliminating the requirements that there be a
"substantial" understatement of tax attributable to a "grossly" erroneous
item of the other spouse. Now all that is required is an understatement of
tax attributable to an erroneous item of the other spouse. 29 The other
prior-law requirements for traditional relief-in particular, the knowledge
and equity requirements-remain unchanged.
b. New "Proportionate Relief'
The 1998 Act also added two new forms of relief from joint and sev-
eral liability. The first allows a spouse to elect to limit her liability for a
deficiency to her allocable share of the deficiency. 30 The deficiency is al-
located in the same proportion that the spouse's erroneous items bear to
the total amount of erroneous items giving rise to the deficiency.3 1 For
example, assume a $10,000 deficiency is assessed with respect to a joint
return. The deficiency arises from $30,000 of underreported income of
one spouse and $20,000 of overstated deductions of the second spouse. If
understatement); Purificato v. Comm'r, 9 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that
court will be more likely to grant relief if spouse did not specifically benefit from
understatement); Ebeling v. Comm'r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3102, 3104 (1994) (find-
ing no inequity in not granting relief to taxpayer with "lavish lifestyle").
25. See H.R. REP. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1502 (1984) (explaining reasons for
change in law).
26. See, e.g., Estate of Krock v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 672, 677-79 (1989) (discuss-
ing other factors to consider in determining inequity).
27. Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015).
28. For an informative account of the enactment of the 1998 Act innocent
spouse provisions, see Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, The New Innocent Spouse Provi-
sion: "Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand"?, 80 TAx NOTES 835, 841-48 (1998).
29. See I.R.C. § 6015(b) (1) (B) (2003).
30. See I.R.C. § 6015(c) (1) (2003).
31. See I.R.C. § 6015(d) (1) (2003). Items are generally allocated in the same
manner as if the individuals had filed separate returns for the year. See I.R.C.
§ 6015(d) (3) (A) (2003). The Treasury Department has interpreted this to mean
that income and deductions relating to the business activities of one spouse are
allocated to that spouse, and income and deductions relating to property owned
by one spouse are allocated to that spouse. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(d) (2) (ii),
(iii) (2003).
2004]
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the first spouse so elects, her liability for the deficiency will be limited to a
fraction of the total liability, with her erroneous item as the numerator of
the fraction and the total amount of erroneous items as the denominator.
Thus, her liability will be limited to $6,000 ($10,000 x $30,000/$50,000).32
This first new form of relief ("proportionate relief") is available only
to a spouse who-at the time she elects such relief-is divorced or legally
separated from the other spouse, or has lived apart from the other spouse
during the twelve-month period ending on the date relief is elected.
33
The general allocation method described in the preceding paragraph is
subject to various modifications and exceptions to ensure an appropriate
allocation of liability. 34 In addition, proportionate relief is unavailable if
assets are transferred from one to the other with the principal purpose of
tax avoidance or if one or both spouses act fraudulently.35 Finally, a
spouse is not relieved of liability for any portion of the deficiency attributa-
32. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252-53 (1998) (providing detailed ex-
amples); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(d) (5), exs. 1-6. The election to limit liabil-
ity applies only to the spouse making the election; the non-electing spouse remains
liable for the entire deficiency.
33. See I.R.C. § 6015(c) (2003). It is difficult to discern the policy rationale
for so limiting this form of relief. Indeed, as has been gleefully pointed out by a
former Treasury official involved with the legislation, the Republican-controlled
Congress that passed the 1998 Act appears to have unwittingly enacted a relief
provision that rewards those whose marriages are no longer intact. See Interview
with Christopher Rizek, Associate Tax Legislative Counsel (Nov. 14, 1998). In real-
ity, limiting the relief to this subset of joint return filers is the result of a compro-
mise between those who wanted it available to all joint filers and those who did not
want it at all. Robinson & Ferrari, supra note 28, at 844-45 (explaining compro-
mise between opponents).
34. To the extent that the erroneous item of one spouse gives rise to a tax
benefit to the other spouse (e.g., one spouse's deductions reduce other spouse's
income), that item is allocated to the other spouse. See I.R.C. § 6015(d) (3) (B)
(2003); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252 (1998). A disallowed credit or
the imposition of special taxes (taxes other than the income tax or the alternative
minimum tax, such as the self-employment tax) related to one spouse's erroneous
item is allocated directly to that spouse dollar-for-dollar and the remaining defi-
ciency is allocated in accordance with the general allocation method described
above. See I.R.C. § 6015(d) (2) (2003); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 253
(1998).
35. A spouse's allocated share of a deficiency is increased by the value of any
"disqualified assets" transferred to the spouse by the other spouse. See I.R.C.
§ 6015(c) (4) (A) (2003). A disqualified asset is defined as an asset transferred
from one spouse to the other if the principal purpose of the transfer was tax avoid-
ance. See I.R.C. § 6015(c) (4) (B) (i) (2003). An asset transferred from the other
spouse to the spouse electing relief is presumed to be for the principal purpose of
tax avoidance if it is transferred within one year after the first notice of proposed
deficiency allowing for administrative review in the Internal Revenue Service Of-
fice of Appeals is sent, unless the spouse rebuts the presumption or unless the
transfer is made pursuant to a divorce or separate maintenance decree. See I.R.C.
§ 6015(c)(4)(B) (ii) (2003). The IRS may depart from the general allocation
method if it establishes that such a departure is appropriate due to fraud of one or
both spouses. See I.R.C. § 6015(c) (3) (A) (ii) (2003). The spouses are ineligible to
elect to allocate liability if the IRS demonstrates that assets were transferred be-
tween them as part of a fraudulent scheme. See I.R.C. § 6015(d) (3) (C) (2003).
[Vol. 49: p. 261
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ble to an item of the other spouse if the IRS demonstrates that the spouse
seeking relief had actual knowledge of the item at the time she signed the
return.
3 6
In contrast to traditional relief, where mere "reason to know" of an
erroneous item is sufficient to disqualify a spouse from relief, proportion-
ate relief is precluded only if the spouse has "actual knowledge" of an
erroneous item.3 7 The legislative history states that "actual knowledge
must be established by the evidence and shall not be inferred based on
indications that the electing spouse had a reason to know."38 This sug-
gests that the actual knowledge test is qualitatively different from the rea-
son-to-know test in that actual knowledge cannot be inferred from
evidence such as the spouse's education, financial acumen and involve-
ment in the family business affairs.3 9 As under traditional relief, mere
knowledge of an erroneous item, and not its tax treatment, has been held
to be sufficient to meet the "actual knowledge" test.
40
c. New "Equitable Relief'
The second new form of relief created by the 1998 Act ("equitable
relief') is a residual provision, authorizing the IRS to provide relief in situ-
ations where neither traditional nor proportionate relief is available, but it
would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable.4 1 The legislative history
cites as an example the situation where there is no understatement of tax,
but there is an underpayment of tax-that is, the return correctly reports
36. See I.R.C. § 6015(c) (3) (C) (2003).
37. In addition, the IRS must demonstrate that the spouse had actual knowl-
edge, in contrast to traditional relief, where the spouse must prove that she did not
know, or have reason to know, of the understatement. See H.R. CONF. REI'. No.
105-599, at 253 (1998).
38. Id.
39. See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 195 (2000), affd, 282 F.2d 326 (5th
Cir. 2002) (actual knowledge is "an actual and clear awareness (as opposed to rea-
son to know) of the existence of an item"); Wiksell v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH)
1336, 1337 (1999), affd, 215 F.3d 1335 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that actual
knowledge is demonstrated by fact that wife questioned husband about items of
income not shown on return).
Actual knowledge would clearly be demonstrated by, for example, an admis-
sion by the spouse that she had actual knowledge of an item. Such admissions are
not uncommon in the administration of innocent spouse cases. The Treasury De-
partment cites, as factors that go towards establishing actual knowledge, whether
the spouse made a deliberate effort to avoid learning of an erroneous item and
whether the spouses had joint ownership of the property giving rise to an errone-
ous item. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-3(c) (2) (iv) (2003).
40. Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.2d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating actual
knowledge is knowledge of facts and circumstances that made item allowable as
deduction); Mitchell v. Comm'r, 292 F.3d 800, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding
I.R.C. § 6015 (c) (3) (C) "does not require the IRS to show that an individual seek-
ing subsection (c) relief had actual knowledge of the improper tax treatment").
41. See I.R.C. § 6015(f) (2003).
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the couple's tax liability, but the liability is not paid. 42 In this situation,
neither traditional nor proportionate relief is available because both of
these require that there be an understatement of tax. 43 The legislative
history envisions the third relief provision possibly applying in the un-
derpayment situation. The legislative history also makes clear that this is
not the only instance where residual relief might be available.
44
There has been relatively little interpretation of the equitable relief
provision. The Treasury Department's published guidance specifically ad-
dresses the underpayment situation contemplated by the legislative his-
tory, setting forth a safe harbor under which relief will ordinarily be
granted. 45 The guidance also sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors the
Treasury Department considers relevant in determining whether to grant
equitable relief.4 6 The courts have yet to fully address the scope and appli-
cability of the equitable relief provision, generally deferring to the IRS's
discretion in determining whether to grant relief.47 In several cases in the
past year, however, the Tax Court has overturned the IRS's determination
not to grant equitable relief and substituted its own judgment that equita-
ble relief was warranted.
48
42. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (stating there can be no relief
where tax was shown on joint return, but not paid with return).
43. To be precise, a traditional relief requires that there be an understate-
ment, and proportionate relief requires that there be a deficiency. For purposes of
this Article, an understatement and a deficiency have the same definition.
44. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 254-55 (1998).
45. See Rev. Proc. 2003-6, 2003-32 I.R.B. 296. Under the safe harbor, a spouse
will ordinarily be relieved of liability for an underpayment if the following require-
ments are met: (1) at the time the return was filed, she did not know, or have
reason to know, that the tax would be unpaid; (2) at the time relief is sought, she is
divorced or legally separated from the other spouse, or they have been living apart
from each other for twelve months; and (3) she would suffer economic hardship if
relief were not granted. As under proportionate relief, tax avoidance or fraud will
disqualify a spouse for relief. See id.
46. The listed relevant factors are (1) marital status; (2) economic hardship;
(3) knowledge or reason to know; (4) nonrequesting spouse's legal obligation; (5)
significant benefit; (6) compliance with income tax laws; (7) abuse; and (8) mental
or physical health. See id.
47. See, e.g., Weight v. Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 98 (2003) (holding peti-
tioner proportionately liable for her 1996 federal income tax liability); Feldman v.
Comm'r, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 50 (2003) (attributing liability solely to husband); Col-
lier v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799 (2002) (holding defendant failed to carry
her burden of establishing other factors that weigh in favor of granting relief).
48. See Washington v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 137 (2003) (holding that IRS abused
discretion in denying relief under section 6015(f)); Gay v. Comm'r, T.C. Summary
Opinion 2003-36 (2003) (unpublished summary opinion) (holding petitioner was
entitled to equitable relief); Ferrarese v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 400 (2002)
(holding that IRS gave too much weight to taxpayer's knowledge of spouse's em-
bezzled income); August v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 183, 186 (2002) (holding
that IRS abused its discretion in denying section 6015(f) relief); Cheshire v.
Comm'r, 115 T.C. 183, 199 (2000) (holding that IRS abused discretion in not
granting section 6015(f) relief for penalties and additions to tax).
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III. TAX RATIONALES FOR JOINT AND SEvERAL LIABILITY
As described in the previous part, current law imposes joint and sev-
eral liability on married joint filers unless relief is available under the inno-
cent spouse laws. This part examines the traditional rationales that have
been offered for imposingjoint and several liability on marriedjoint filers.
A. Marital Unity
1. Background
The principal tax rationale for joint and several liability rests on the
notion that a married couple is a single economic unit and, thus, a single
taxpaying unit. The notion that a married couple is a single unit first ap-
peared in 1921, quite early in the history of the joint, return.4 9 At first, all
it meant was that a husband's and wife's income and deductions were ag-
gregated in determining the tax liability of each, sometimes to the benefit
of taxpayers, as when a husband was permitted to use his wife's losses to
decrease his taxable income, and sometimes to their detriment, as when a
husband's and wife's incomes were aggregated and taxed at a higher rate
under the progressive rate structure. 50 Soon, however, marital unity was
invoked to support the claim that each spouse should be liable for the
entire tax relating to a joint return.
5 1
Surprisingly, when Congress explicitly imposed joint and several lia-
bility on joint return filers in 1938,52 it did not cite marital unity as its
justification. Instead, the legislative history refers somewhat cryptically to
"administrative reasons" and the "privilege of filing such joint returns" as
the rationale for joint and several liability. 53 Nonetheless, marital unity
has come to be viewed as the principal rationale for the joint return and,
49. The joint return was first authorized in 1918. See Beck, supra note 6, at
33547 (explaining Revenue Act of 1918). In 1921, the government argued that a
joint return should be "treated as the return of a taxable unit... as though the
return were that of a single individual." Op. Solicitor 90, 4 C.B. 236, 238 (1921).
50. See Op. Solicitor 90, 4 C.B. 236, 238 (1921) ("In cases, therefore, in which
the husband or wife has allowable deductions in excess of his or her gross income,
such excess may, if ajoint return is filed, be deducted from the net income of the
other for the purpose of computing both the normal and surtax."); see also Beck,
supra note 6, at 335-36 (same).
The government attempted to change its earlier position and argued for sepa-
rate taxpayer treatment when doing so would increase the tax due. See, e.g., Article
117-5 of Regulation 86 (1935) (disallowing deduction of one spouse's capital losses
against capital gains of the other spouse). But see Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189
(1940) (invalidating Article 117-5); see also, Beck, supra note 6, at 337-38.
51. See I.T. 1575, II-1 C.B. 144 (1923) (husband and wife "are individually
liable for the full amount of tax shown to be due on a joint return" because "a
single joint return is one return of a taxable unit").
52. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476.
53. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong. (3d Sess. 29-30 1938), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B., pt. 2, at 728, 749. These other rationales for joint and several liability are
discussed below. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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with it, joint and several liability.54 The following paragraphs briefly trace
the development of this fiction as the centerpiece for our tax treatment of
married couples.
2. The Fiction of Marital Unity
55
The concept of marital unity appeared in 1921, shortly after the in-
ception of the joint return, but it did not begin to evolve into orthodoxy
until the tax law changes of 1948. It was at this time that Congress created
an income-splitting scheme, which allowed husbands 56 residing in com-
mon law states to shift one-half of the income they earned to their wives
for tax purposes. Under a progressive tax rates structure, this had the
effect of reducing their tax burden.57 Prior to 1948, only husbands resid-
ing in community property states could take advantage of income split-
ting. The political motivation for the 1948 tax law change was to procure
for husbands in common law states the lower tax burden enjoyed by their
counterparts in community property states, thus rendering meaningless
for tax purposes the stronger property rights of women in community
property states and quelling the movement towards adoption of commu-
nity property laws. 58 The camouflage for the political motivation was the
unfounded assertion that a married couple is a single unit and that equal-
income marital units should bear the same tax burden no matter what
their state of residence.
59
The fiction of marital unity was also relied upon to amend the estate
tax laws in 1948. As with the income tax changes, the estate tax laws were
changed to reduce the tax burden of husbands residing in common law
states, thereby equalizing their tax burden with that of husbands in com-
munity property states. As with the income tax, the same political motiva-
tion was again at work, and again it was rationalized by the unconsidered
proclamation that marital units of equal wealth ought to pay equal
amounts of estate tax.
60
54. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 6, at 377 ("If joint liability can be justified at all,
it is only through an appeal to some special economic nature of the marital
relationship.").
55. The following account is based on Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAxING
AMERICA (Mary Louise Fellows & Karen Brown eds., 1996).
56. I use the term "husbands" because men were the dominant income earn-
ers and wealth holders at this time.
57. Instead of the husband's income being taxed at one progression through
the rate brackets, half the husband's income was taxed at two progressions
through those rate brackets.
58. See Kahng, supra note 55, at 26-32.
59. See id. at 28-30.
60. See id. at 32 (explaining that like income tax amendments, stated goal of
estate tax amendments was to equalize tax burden on husbands in all states, but
alleged goal "was even less plausible in the estate ... context, given that 1942 Act
equalized the estate and gift tax burden on community property states").
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The estate tax story did not end in 1948, for lawmakers inadvertently
had created a tax disincentive for dower, the time-honored pattern of
wealth transmission in which women inherited only income, never capi-
tal. 6 1 Ultimately, in 1981, the disincentive was removed and the privileged
tax status of dower was restored. The explanation for doing so should not
be surprising at this point-marital unity.
62
That marital unity was a convenient fiction, serving as political camou-
flage, was forgotten over the years. By 1976, marital unity had been ele-
vated to a first principle of taxation, as evidenced by an observation of
Professor Boris Bittker, one of the most influential tax scholars of the
twentieth century: " IT] he 1948 statutory principle of equal taxes for equal-
income married couples has been 'almost universally accepted' by tax
theorists .... "63
B. Other Tax Rationales
The other tax rationales for joint and several liability are less signifi-
cant than marital unity. This section presents them primarily for the sake
of completeness.
1. Administrative Convenience
Administrative convenience is frequently cited as a reason for impos-
ing joint and several liability. 64 The argument is that because a husband's
and wife's items of income, deduction, gain and loss are aggregated on a
joint return, it is difficult or impossible to determine the separate tax lia-
bility of each. As Professor Richard Beck has pointed out, this problem
could be remedied by eliminating aggregation and instead requiring each
spouse to report separately his or her own items of income, deduction,
61. See id. at 33-34 ("The assumption underlying the marital deduction was
mistaken in a crucial respect: husbands did not want to share their wealth with
their wives. They wanted to retain control over their wealth through dower trans-
fers, but dower transfers did not qualify for the marital deduction.").
62. See id. at 36-37 ("The legislative history of these provisions explains them
by reference to the notion of the married couple as the taxpaying unit: all transfers
within the unit should be exempt ....").
63. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv.
1389, 1395 (1975) (citation omitted).
64. The legislative history of the 1938 Act cites administrative convenience as
one of the reasons for adopting statutory joint and several liability in 1938. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. The government also made, and lost, the
argument for joint and several liability on the basis of administrative convenience
in Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1935), a decision that was eventu-
ally reversed by the 1938 legislation.
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gain and loss on a dual-column joint return, as is done in several states. 65
Segregating each spouse's tax items is not a difficult task.
66
2. Price for Tax Benefits of Joint Return
Another rationale given for joint and several liability is that it is the
price married taxpayers must pay for the benefits they enjoy from filing a
joint return.6 7 The principal benefit is a lower total tax liability than if the
married couple filed separate returns. 68 This rationale is implausible at
best, as Professor Beck persuasively argues. He states three main re-
sponses to the price-for-benefits rationale: (1) the benefit that married
couples receive from filing ajoint return is variable and bears no reasona-
ble relation to the burden ofjoint and several liability; (2) the "benefit" is
sometimes actually a penalty in the form of a greater tax liability; and (3)
the burden of joint and several liability often ends up being borne by the
spouse who received little or no benefit from filing the joint return.
69
C. Inadequacy of Tax Rationales
This part has argued that the most plausible tax rationale for impos-
ing joint and several liability-the notion that husband and wife are a sin-
gle taxpaying unit-is a fiction. The other rationales for joint and several
liability are unpersuasive. Given the inadequacy of these rationales, one
might conclude that a married individual, like any other individual,
should be liable for taxes relating to his or her own activities and invest-
ments, and not those of any other person. 70 The fiction of marital unity,
65. See Beck, supra note 6, at 389-90 (explaining different ways states tax
spouses); see also Christian I, supra note 6, at 559-63 (discussing administrative ne-
cessity rationale for joint and several liability).
66. This is demonstrated by those states using a dual-column joint return. It
is further demonstrated by both the prior law and the current law in federal inno-
cent spouse provisions, both of which require that items giving rise to deficiency be
allocated to one spouse or the other.
67. See Cole, 81 F.2d at 487 ("[R]espondent contends that by reason of elect-
ing to report their income for 1929 in ajoint return, a privilege which the statute
grants to married persons, petitioner and his wife must.., be treated as one ....
[W]e held against the respondent's contention.").
68. Another benefit is the administrative convenience of aggregating items of
income, deduction, gain and loss.
69. See Beck, supra note 6, at 369-77 (asserting that policy reasons for impos-
ing joint and several liability on joint return filers are "obscure at best").
70. Several commentators have proposed that joint and several liability be
abolished, thereby eliminating the need for any relief provisions such as the inno-
cent spouse rules. See Beck, supra note 6, at 408; Jerome Borison, Alice Through a
Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from the Tax Court in Innocent
Spouse Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q. 123, 171 (1996); Christian I, supra note 6, at 615-17;
Martha W. Jordan, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Defining a Proportionate Solution, 24
OHlo N.U. L. REv. 517, 550 (1998).
More broadly, others have proposed eliminating the joint return, along with
joint and several liability, and adopting mandatory separate return filing. See
Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Bur-
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however, is so deeply embedded in our tax system that joint and several
liability is highly unlikely to be completely abolished. In addition, joint
and several liability is not unique to tax law. It is imposed in many other
contexts, which may provide guidance in determining whether joint and
several tax liability can be justified. The next part examines non-tax ratio-
nales for joint and several liability, with a view toward their possible appli-
cability to the tax treatment of married individuals.
IV. NON-TAX RATIONALES FOR JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILrrV
This part briefly examines the rationales in other areas of law where
liability is imposed on more than one individual. The liability might be
joint and several, as in tort law, or it might be liability imposed on an
individual for harms caused by another individual, as in vicarious liability,
or it might be liability imposed on an individual for the debt or obligation
of another, as in transferee liability.
A. Tort Rationales
Joint and several liability first developed in the area of tort law and
was originally imposed where two or more individuals acted in concert to
cause a harm or where they breached a common duty owed to the plain-
tiff.7' The scope of joint and several liability was gradually expanded to
include situations where multiple tortfeasors contributed to a single
harm,7 2 although in recent years it has been quite dramatically limited.
73
Three rationales are commonly given for imposing joint and several liabil-
ity in the context of multiple tortfeasors contributing to a single harm.
1. Fairness
One rationale for imposing joint and several liability on multiple ac-
tors contributing to a single harm is that it increases the likelihood that
dens, 59 TEX. L. REv. 1, 39 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the
IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63,
108-09 (1993).
71. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 46, at 322-23 (5th ed. 1984) (defining "concerted action").
72. See id. § 47, at 328-29 (defining "entire liability").
73. A majority of states have curtailed joint and several liability. SeeJonathan
Cardi, Note, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on
Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 IowA L. REv.
1293, 1303-04 nn.54-55 (1997) (listing thirty-six states that have abolished, modi-
fied or limited joint and several liability). The Restatement (Third) of Torts also
moved substantially away from joint and several liability towards proportionate lia-
bility. See Frank J. Vandall, A Critique of the Restatement (Third), Apportionment as It
Affects Joint and Several Liability, 49 EMORY L.J. 565, 619-22 (2000) (arguing Restate-
ment has overstepped bounds in rewriting law). The retrenchment of joint and
several liability is one of numerous tort law changes growing out of the economic
and insurance-related analysis of tort law. See generally George Priest, Economics of
Civil Justice Reform Proposals, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2000) (discussing justifi-
cations for "substantive civil justice reform proposals").
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the plaintiff will be fully compensated for the harm suffered.7 4 The plain-
tiff is free to proceed against, and can recover from, any or all defend-
ants. 75 Another way that this rationale is sometimes articulated is that
joint and several liability shifts the risk of an insolvent defendant from the
plaintiff to the other defendants. 76 In either case, the idea is that the
plaintiff, being the innocent victim, should be given the best chance for
full compensation, leaving the defendants, all of whom are wrongdoers, to
seek an appropriate allocation of damages among themselves through the
doctrine of contribution.
77
74. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 71, at 330-32 (explainingjudgment and satis-
faction); David B. Spence, Imposing Individual Liability as a Legislative Policy Choice:
Holmesian "Intuitions" and Superfund Reform, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 389, 400 (1999) (ex-
plaining purpose ofjoint and several liability); Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liabil-
ity Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability
for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1141, 1142-43 (1988) (ex-
plaining negative consequences of proportionate several liability and positive con-
sequences of joint and several liability).
75. See Cardi, supra note 73, at 1301 (explaining defendant has burden of
distributing fault to others, not plaintiff); see also Michael Green & William Charles
Power, Jr., Apportionment of Liability, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 30, 37 (2000) (ex-
plaining plaintiffs remedy).
76. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The
Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 862 (1987) (discussing effects of
shifting burden to defendant); Wright, supra note 74, at 114243 (asserting that
placing burden on defendant creates chance of insolvency).
77. See Douglas F. Brennan, Joint and Several Liability for Generators Under
Superfund: A Federal Formula for Cost Recovery, 5 UCLAJ. ErVTL. L. & POL'V 101, 115
(1986) (explaining purpose ofjoint and several liability); Carol A. Mutter, Moving
to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform; Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L.
REv. 199, 306 (1990) (explaining pros and cons ofjoint and several liability). Con-
tribution was not always available among joint tortfeasors, but became more preva-
lent in American courts as they expanded the application of joint and several
liability. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 71, at 336-41 (detailing history of contribu-
tion); LyndaJ. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 299, 306-12 (1995) (explaining common law rule of joint and
several liability).
Some commentators have argued that joint and several liability undermines,
rather than promotes, fairness because it increases the risk that at least some de-
fendants will end up paying more than their share of damages. See, e.g., Abraham,
supra note 76, at 862 (" [T] he amount of liability imposed bears no necessary rela-
tion to the degree of responsibility of any particular defendant for the plaintiffs
injury. In certain cases the amount of liability imposed may not even reflect the
probability that a particular defendant is responsible at all."); Jerry L. Anderson,
The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. LJ. 1, 32-36 (1993) (explaining cost-shar-
ing rationale is inadequate for hazardous waste clean up); John C. Moorhouse et
al., Law and Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REv.
667, 679 (1998) (assertingjoint and several liability is unfair because plaintiffs will
sue those with "deep pockets"); Mutter, supra, at 314 (same);John W. Wade, Should
Joint and Several Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors Be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL Avoc.
193, 193 (1986) (same).
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2. Difficulties of Determining Relative Fault
Joint and several liability is also justified in situations where it is diffi-
cult or impossible to determine the relative fault of multiple wrongdo-
ers.78 This is sometimes couched in terms of difficulty of ascertaining the
causative role played by each wrongdoer.79 To some extent, the underly-
ing policy goal here, as in "Fairness" above, seems to be to fully compen-
sate the plaintiff, regardless of the allocation of blame among various
defendants.8 0
3. Deterrence
In some contexts, joint and several liability is advocated to heighten
deterrence of undesirable behavior by increasing the probability that at
least some defendants will pay more than their proportionate share of
damages.8 1 Whether joint and several liability in fact increases or de-
78. See MICHAEL HOENIG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL AND
POLICY ISSUES 191 (1992) ("At common law, the joint and several liability imposed
upon joint tortfeasors was indivisible. Thus, any one of the joint tortfeasors was
liable to the injured party for the entire damage."). But see Nancy L. Manzer, Note,
1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limita-
tions on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 628, 643-46 (1988) (arguing it
is unjust to make entity pay for another tortfeasor's faults).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875, 879 (1979) (explaining that
joint and several liability is imposed when the harm "cannot be apportioned" (sec-
tion 879) or the harm is "single and indivisible" (section 875)); Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1816-18 (1985) (noting difficulty in
ascertaining causation with multiple tortfeasors); Richard W. Wright, The Logic and
Fairness ofJoint and Several Liability, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 45, 59 (1992) (noting
difficulty in ascertaining causation with separable injuries); Note, Joint and Several
Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1187
(1982) (asserting joint and several liability in Superfund would give government
flexibility to recover to fullest extent possible from defendants that can be
identified).
80. See William K. Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and
Victims Variously Vigilant, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 253, 290-91 (2001) ("If that harm is
indivisible, and if it could have been avoided had care been taken by any one of
the multiple defendants, then the fair share of each is 100%.");John H. Wigmore,
Joint Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages: Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Re-
dress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458, 459 (1923) (giving example of unredressable party that
cannot identify tortfeasor).
81. This is true for "deep pocket" defendants, from whom plaintiffs are more
likely to seek full recovery, leaving such defendants to the expense and vagaries of
seeking contribution from other defendants. See Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schief-
fer, Joint and Several Liability: A Casefor Reform, 64 DENV. U. L. REv. 651, 652 (1988)
("[D]eep pocket defendants ... are especially likely to be brought into a suit when
it appears likely that the party most responsible for the harm is judgment proof.").
The argument that joint and several liability heightens deterrence is com-
monly made in the toxic tort context. See Brennan, supra note 77, at 114-15 (argu-
ing that joint and several liability encourages responsible behavior); Anita M.
D'Arcy, Note, Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 489,
522 (1982) (asserting that joint and several liability may deter future improper
disposal); David J. Engel, Note, Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund: The Plight
of the Small Volume Hazardous Waste Contributor, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1057, 1080 n.128
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Another area of law where liability is imposed on more than one indi-
vidual is agency law. Liability is vicarious-one individual (the principal)
is held liable for the actions of another individual (the agent) by virtue of
the principal's relationship with the agent.83 Under certain circum-
stances, a principal may be liable for an agent's tortious conduct or may be
bound by contractual obligations entered into by the agent.84 The legal
definition of the principal/agent relationship is a "fiduciary relation which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and be subject to his control."85 Econo-
mists define the agency relationship as one in which the principal employs
or contracts with the agent and does not directly control the agent.8 6 Re-
lationships that typically result in the imposition of vicarious liability in-
clude: principal/agent, employer/employee and partner/partner.8 7 The
(1985) (stating that joint and several liability gives industries incentive to reduce
production of waste and to dispose of waste properly).
82. Compare WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF TORT LAw 193 (1987) (noting that joint and several liability may be more
effective deterrent), and Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Dam-
ages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L.J. 831, 833 (1989) (asserting that joint
and several liability may be more efficient under some circumstances), and William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis,
9J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 529-31 (1980) (discussing contribution in joint and several
liability), with Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Contribu-
tion Model, 25 ENVrL. L. 549, 570-71 (1995) (explaining joint and several liability
may result in over- or under-deterrence), and Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Envi-
ronmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. RE,. 1495, 1525 (1999) (stating that Superfund's
joint and several liability has resulted in sub-optimal cleanup efforts and site aban-
donment), and Landes & Posner, supra, at 543 (arguing that joint and several lia-
bility, coupled with contribution, results in high administrative costs), and Kathryn
E. Spier, A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives, 23J.
LEGAL STUD. 559, 560 (1994) ("The excessive value that the plaintiff derives from
settlement will induce the defendants to over invest in precautions ex ante ...."),
and Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the
Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1125, 1127 (1989) (assertingjoint and several liability
accentuates and exacerbates all imperfections in present tort compensation sys-
tem). See generally Moorhouse et al., supra note 77, at 678-79 (describing both
sides).
83. A principal may also be liable by virtue of the principal's own actions, but
this type of liability is generally excluded from the definition of vicarious liability.
84. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY chs. 6, 7 (1958) (discussing
principal liability to third persons).
85. Id. § 1 (1958).
86. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1346-47 (1982); Alan 0.
Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231 (1984).
87. Particularly in recent years, commentators have argued for the extension
of vicarious liability to other relationships. See, e.g., Valerie D. Barton, Comment,
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rationales for vicarious liability can be grouped into two categories: fair-
ness and efficiency.
1. Fairness
One rationale for vicarious liability is that it is fair orjust. According
to Judge Friendly, vicarious liability rests "in a deeply rooted sentiment
that a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for acci-
dents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities." 88 An-
other formulation of the fairness rationale for vicarious liability is that it
offers more adequate compensation for victims, while distributing costs
among those who have benefited from the activities giving rise to the
harm.8 9 Other, more complex fairness rationales include one based on
reciprocity of risk and another based on a corrective justice approach. 90
2. Deterrence/Efficiency
Another rationale for vicarious liability is creating an incentive for an
individual to monitor or supervise the actions of another. The underlying
premise is that the individual with the supervisory duty, by virtue of his
relationship with the wrongdoer, is in a position to prevent the harm com-
mitted by the wrongdoer.9 1 A related rationale for vicarious liability is that
under certain circumstances it is efficient-that is, it deters socially unde-
sirable behavior or optimizes societal allocation of resources in a cost-ef-
fective manner, by, for example, minimizing transaction costs or
spreading the risk of loss.
9 2
Reconciling the Burden: Parental Liability for the Tortious Acts of Minors, 51 EMORY LJ.
877, 880 (2002) (advocating parent-child vicarious liability in wake of Columbine
High School shooting); Barbara A. Micheels, Comment, Is Justice Served? The Devel-
opment of Tort Liability Against the Passive Parent in Incest Cases, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
809, 810-11 (1997) (advocating liability for "innocent" spouse who permitted other
spouse to abuse child); Michele M. O'Malley, Comment, The Misapplication of Com-
parative Negligence: An Argument for the Use ofJoint and Several Liability in Gun Control,
40 WASHBURN LJ. 334, 335 (2001) (advocating use of joint and several liability if
child negligently injures another using parents' gun); Richard Smith, Note, A Com-
parative Analysis of Dramshop Liability and a Proposal for Uniform Legislation, 25 IowAJ.
CORP. L. 553, 574-76 (2000) (advocating dramshop liability for accidents resulting
from improper sale of alcohol).
88. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir.
1968).
89. See Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability,
95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1356 (1997) ("The choice between negligence and enter-
prise liability is a choice between leaving a grave and underserved misfortune on
the victim, and inflicting a far lesser burden on those who deserve to bear the
costs.").
90. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1749-54 (1996) (describing various fairness justifi-
cations for vicarious liability).
91. See Keeton et al., supra note 71, at 346-48, 500-01 (discussing general as-
pects of and justification for vicarious liability).
92. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 120-21 (1987) (explaining respondeat superior); STEVEN
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C. Fraudulent Conveyance/Transferee Liability Rationales
Under certain circumstances, if a debtor makes a fraudulent transfer
of assets to a third party, a creditor can reach those assets to satisfy his
debt.93 A fraudulent transfer is one made with the intent to hinder, delay
or defraud a creditor.9 4 Actual fraud can be established indirectly by fac-
tors such as: (1) the existence of a familial or agency relationship between
the transferor and the transferee; (2) the concealment of the transfer
from creditors; (3) the receipt by the transferor of property on exchange
less valuable than that the transferor gave up; and (4) the transferor's
poor financial condition or insolvency at or upon the transfer.
9 5 In the
absence of actual fraudulent intent, constructive intent may be found if
the transfer was made without adequate consideration and the debtor ei-
ther: (1) was insolvent at the time of the transfer; (2) became insolvent as
a result of it or was thinly capitalized; or (3) did not intend not to pay his
debts as they became due.96 Fraudulent conveyance law was originally
grounded in fairness rationales, but more recently efficiency justifications
have also been developed.
1. Fairness/Morality
One rationale for fraudulent conveyance law is that a debtor has a
moral obligation not to make gifts while insolvent. 97 This rationale is also
couched in fairness terms: a debtor has the duty to be fair to all credi-
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccIDENT LAw 170-75 (1987) (discussing vicarious
liability); Kornhauser, supra note 86, at 1346-47 (discussing rationales for enter-
prise liability); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analy-
sis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 563,
565-70 (1988) (discussing efficiency of vicarious liability in employment relation-
ship); Sykes, supra note 86, at 1235-36 (discussing risk efficiency in agency
liability).
93. See ELIZABETH WARREN &JAYWESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS 138-40 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing development of Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act).
94. See PETER ALCES, THE LAw OF FRAUDULENT TRANsAcTIONS § 7:4 (1989) (ex-
plaining requirements of fraudulent transfers).
95. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act §§ 4(b)(1), (2), (4), (8) (1984); see also
Frank R. Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 UCC L.J. 195, 200-08
(1986) (discussing specific requirements for fraud under UFTA); Louis J. Vener,
Transfers in Fraud of Creditors Under the Uniform Acts and the Bankruptcy Code, 92 CoM.
L.J. 218, 222-42 (1987) (explaining general requirements of fraud).
96. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyances Act §§ 4-8 (1918); see alsoJohn C. McCoid
II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for Inadequate Consideration, 62
TEX. L. REv. 639, 656-57 (1983) (discussing factors associated with constructive
intent to defraud).
97. See Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90
HARV. L. REv. 505, 509-11, 544 (1977) (explaining debtors' moral obligation to
give primary consideration to legal obligations over personal interests and further
explaining creditors' fundamental right to expect insolvent debtors not to make
transfers).
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tors.98 Also, the purpose of fraudulent transfer law is to prevent unjust
depletion of the debtor's estate to the detriment of creditors. 99
2. Efficiency
The other rationale for fraudulent conveyance law is based on effi-
ciency. Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson's influential article
was one of the first to conduct an efficiency analysis of fraudulent convey-
ance law. Starting with the proposition that "[t]he ambition of... fraudu-
lent conveyance law, should provide all the parties with the type of
contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and
money to bargain over all aspects of their deal," they conclude that the
scope of fraudulent conveyance law should be a quite limited one, apply-
ing to invalidate only sham transactions and gratuitous transfers. 10 0 Other
commentators, explicitly adopting an efficiency perspective, have since ar-
gued for a broader scope for fraudulent conveyance laws.10 1
V. EVALUATION OF CURRENT LAW
This part evaluates the current law treatment of married couples fil-
ingjointly by reference to the rationales for joint and several liability de-
scribed in Part IV.
A. Traditional Relief
The elements of traditional relief that are relevant to this analysis are
(1) that there be an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items
of the other spouse; (2) that the spouse seeking relief did not know, and
had no reason to know, that there was an understatement; and (3) it is
inequitable to hold the spouse seeking relief liable for the deficiency in
tax attributable to this understatement. 10 2 All of these elements must be
met in order for a spouse not to be held jointly and severally liable. For
purposes of this analysis, it is useful to restate the rules in terms of the
conditions under which the spouse will be liable. Accordingly, a spouse is
98. See Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDozo L. REv.
531, 534 (1987) (explaining that fraudulent transfer rules developed to allow cred-
itors to enforce duty of debtor to be fair to all creditors).
99. SeeJack F. Williams, Revisiting the Proper Limits of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 8
BANKR. DEV. J. 55, 59 (1991) (noting that most commentators agree fraudulent
transfer law exists to prevent unjust diminution of debtor's estate).
100. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law
and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. Rev. 829, 835-36, 840 (1985) (discussing pur-
pose and appropriate scope of conveyance law).
101. See Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA.
L. REv. 1213, 1251 (1997) (advocating efficiency justifications for fraudulent trans-
fer law); Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the
Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 INn. L.J. 781, 784 (1988) (discussing creditors'
fights in leveraged buyouts); Williams, supra note 99, at 127-28 (discussing
problems with modern fraudulent transfer law).
102. See supra notes 14-19, 27-29 and accompanying text.
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liable if (1) the understatement is attributable to her erroneous items, or
(2) she knew, or had reason to know, that there was an understatement, or
(3) it would not be inequitable to hold her liable. This third condition
will be further restated in terms of significant benefit-the factor that
courts have found to be the most important in determining whether the
equity condition is met. Thus, under the third condition of liability, a




The tort rationales for joint and several liability posit that there are
multiple wrongdoers who have contributed to a single harm to a victim. A
threshold problem in applying the tort rationales in the tax context relates
to the identity of the wrongdoers. As applied in the tax context, the harm
is the failure to accurately report and pay a tax liability. The victim is ei-
ther the government, or more generally, all other taxpayers, who will have
to pay more in taxes to make up the revenue shortfall. Identifying the
wrongdoer(s) in the tax context is more difficult. It begs the question to
assert that both husband and wife are responsible for the tax, and that,
therefore, they are both wrongdoers if the tax is not reported and paid.
The underlying question is who should be responsible for the tax?
A basic principle of taxation is that each individual ought to be re-
sponsible for the tax relating to his or her income-producing activities or
investments. As I have argued above, the fiction of marital unity does not
warrant modifying this basic principle. The first element under traditional
relief-which essentially imposes liability for any taxes relating to the activ-
ities of the spouse seeking relief-is consistent with this approach and
splinters the marital unit, underscoring the artificiality of the construct.
Each married individual is a "wrongdoer" with respect to tax liabilities re-
lating to her own activities, just as each unmarried individual is.
Even if one views both spouses as wrongdoers contributing to the
harm, the tort rationales for joint and several liability are ill-fitted to the
tax context. The three tax rationales for joint and several liability are (1)
fairness to the victim, (2) difficulties in ascertaining each wrongdoer's
contribution to the harm and (3) heightened deterrence.
a. Fairness to Victim
The fairness rationale assumes blameworthy wrongdoers and a victim
who deserves full compensation. In the tax context, the fairness rationale
loses force because the failure to report and pay taxes does not inflict sig-
nificant harm on any particular individual. Moreover, in the tax context,
it does not seem particularly unfair that the victim (the government)
should bear the burden of collection and the risk of insolvency. The gov-
103. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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ernment-as-victim is not lacking in resources to pursue compensation for
the harm, nor is it likely to suffer unduly if one or more of the wrongdoers
turns out to be insolvent. Indeed, one of the common complaints about
imposing joint and several liability in the tax context is that the govern-
ment has superior collection capabilities and a greater ability to absorb the
risk of loss and should not be permitted to shift these burdens to a spouse
who is left only with unenforceable contribution rights against the other
spouse.1
0 4
b. Difficulties of Determining Relative Fault
The second tort rationale, that it is difficult to ascertain each individ-
ual's contribution to the harm, also applies poorly in the tax context.
Under traditional relief, each spouse's contribution to the harm-that is,
the failure to report and pay tax-is quite clear. There are two possibili-
ties: (1) the understatement of tax is related to the activities of the spouse
seeking relief or (2) the understatement is related to the activities of the
other spouse.
If the understatement of tax is related to the activities of the spouse
seeking relief, she is liable. In this case, she causes the harm by, for exam-
ple, failing to report income from services she performed or property she
owned, or by claiming overstated or spurious deductions related to a busi-
ness she conducted. If, on the other hand, the understatement is related
to the other spouse's activities, she is liable either if she knew, or had rea-
son to know, of the understatement, or if she significantly benefited from
the understatement, or both.
In the tax setting, then, it is relatively easy to ascertain each spouse's
role in producing the harm. Compare this to the paradigm tort case for
joint and several liability: two defendants shoot towards the plaintiff with
shotguns; only one pellet hits and injures the plaintiff, but it cannot be
ascertained which defendant caused the injury.10 5
104. See Beck, supra note 6, at 324-32 (discussing unfairness of joint liability);
Christian I, supra note 6, at 588-92 (discussing difficulties faced by aggrieved
spouses).
105. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (holding both defendants liable).
The analysis of the causative role played by each spouse highlights another funda-
mental problem in relying on the tort rationales tojustify joint and several liability
in the tax context. It is clear that when an understatement relates to the activities
of the spouse seeking relief, she has caused the understatement by engaging in the
activities and failing to accurately determine their tax consequences. When the
understatement relates to the activities of the other spouse, however, her actions
consist of knowing, or having reason to know, of her spouse's activities, or signifi-
cantly benefiting from the understatement of tax. Neither of these actions appears
to cause the understatement. To return to the paradigm tort case, it would be as if
one defendant were held jointly and severally liable for the shotgun injury to the
plaintiff because he knew the other defendant fired the shotgun towards plaintiff,
or because the injury suffered by the plaintiff allowed the first defendant to shoot a
duck the plaintiff would otherwise have shot.
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c. Deterrence
Increased deterrence is the third tort rationale for imposing joint and
several liability. In general, deterrence is not a principal goal of the tax
system; on the contrary, its goal is to raise revenue while affecting behavior
as little as possible. 10 6 The tax system does have a deterrent aspect, how-
ever. It is designed to deter individuals from failing to report and pay tax
on income they produce. Monitoring for compliance is accomplished by
audits and other enforcement devices, and the penalties for noncompli-
ance include any tax liability owed along with interest charges and penal-
ties. In this way, taxes act as penalties intended to deter the behavior of
noncompliance. 1
0 7
The obligations to report and pay taxes-along with the penalties im-
posed in order to deter noncompliance with these obligations-are gener-
ally imposed on the individual whose activities produce the income.
Imposing the duty to pay the tax on the individual producing the income
comports with the fundamental idea of imposing tax burdens based on
the ability to pay. Requiring that the individual also report the tax makes
sense because he or she knows about the income-producing activities. Of
course, the individual has an incentive not to comply with these obliga-
tions. 10 8 Compliance is sometimes enhanced by imposing these obliga-
tions on additional parties through information reporting and wage
withholding.
1 0 9
106. A tax is more in the nature of a charge for government-provided goods
or services or a contribution for public goods than a behavior-deterring penalty.
107. The standard economic model of deterrence has been applied to tax
compliance. The model was developed by Michael G. Allingham & Agnar
Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, I J. PuB. ECON. 323 (1972), and
is based on Gary Becker's model of criminal enforcement. See Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169, 172 (1968) (dis-
cussing optimal deterrence); see also, e.g., Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate
Tax Evasion, 50 TAx L. Rv. 33, 49-50 (1994) (discussing role of criminal law in
determining taxpayer compliance); Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 255, 274-82 (2002) (discussing potential deterrence
of corporate tax shelters); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1787-88 (2000) (discussing penalty aspect of
taxes).
108. SeeJoshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy,
and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAx Rv. 155, 188-97 (1996) (discussing
taxpayers' financial incentive to underestimate income and overstate deductions
furthered by low risk of getting caught and infrequent penalty enforcement if
caught).
109. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6041 (2003) (wage reporting); id. §§ 6042, 6049 (2003)
(dividend and interest reporting); id. § 3401 (2003) (wage withholding). These
compliance mechanisms have greatly increased compliance. See, e.g., M. Bernard
Aidinoff et al., ABA Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, Report and Recommenda-
tions on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAx LAw. 329, 349 (1987) (discussing costs and
benefits of compliance measures); Gene Steurele, The Tax Gap, 72 TAX NoTEs
1187, 1187-88 (1996) (concluding that reducing opportunity to escape detection
through withholding and third-party reporting reduces noncompliance).
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Information reporting obligations are imposed on those who, like the
taxpayer himself, have knowledge of the item they are required to report,
for example, in the case of a bank that pays interest to the taxpayer or an
employer who pays wages to the taxpayer. The penalties for failure to re-
port are relatively low-generally $50 per violation, subject to overall
yearly limitations' ' 0-presumably because the third parties have little dis-
incentive not to comply.
11 '
Withholding obligations are imposed on those who are the source of
payments made to taxpayers. The payor withholds and remits amounts to
government as advance payments of the taxpayer's tax liability.' 1 2 The
penalties for noncompliance are high-one hundred percent of the
amount required to be withheld and remitted 1' 3-presumably to deter
the payor from diverting the withheld amounts for his own benefit rather
than remitting them to the government. 1 4 Within the deterrence scheme
of the tax system, information reporting and wage withholding are in-
stances where compliance is enhanced by imposing obligations to report
or pay on parties other than the taxpayer. 115 Spousal liability might be
justified as a similar means of enhancing compliance, but upon closer ex-
amination, the parallels prove to be superficial.
Like a bank who pays interest to a taxpayer, the spouse of a taxpayer
may have information that, if reported, would increase compliance by the
taxpayer. One could argue that imposing liability on her for failure to
report this information has the effect of imposing on her a duty to report
and that the duty is imposed in order to increase the taxpayer's compli-
ance. Nevertheless, a spouse's obligation to report, such as it is,1 1 6 differs
in significant ways from the bank's.
110. See I.R.C. §§ 6721-24 (2003).
111. Their principal disincentive is the administrative cost of reporting.
112. Withheld amounts are deemed held in trust for the benefit of the United
States. See I.R.C. § 7501 (2003).
113. See I.R.C. § 3403 (2003) (responsibilities); id. § 6672(a) (2003)
(penalties).
114. Commentators have questioned whether the penalties should be so se-
vere and so broadly applied, but no one has questioned their efficacy. See Mary A.
Bedikian, The Pernicious Reach of 26 U.S.C. Section 6672, 13 VA. TAx REv. 225, 230-31
(1993) (surveying commentators' views on personal tax penalties for corporate of-
ficers); Gerald P. Moran, Willfulness: The Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Sec-
tion 6672, 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 709, 713 (1980) (noting penalty's "economic
harshness" and "severity"); Stephen J. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of LIR C. Section
6672, 67 Ky. L.J. 27, 73 (1978) ("Applications of section 6672, as currently inter-
preted, often impose a harsh penalty on morally innocent and unsuspecting busi-
ness managers."); David M. Walker, The Section 6672 100% Penalty: How to Avoid
Going Down with the Ship, 46 TAx LAw. 801 (1993) (comparing code penalty provi-
sion to Bermuda Triangle).
115. This is not exactly analogous to the tort rationale for joint and several
liability. There, deterrence is not used as a rationale for imposing liability, but
rather as a rationale for making liability joint and several.
116. Of course, unlike the bank, she does not have an explicit obligation to
report, except insofar as she signs the joint return. Her putative reporting duties
HeinOnline  -- 49 Vill. L. Rev. 285 2004
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
First, under traditional relief, she is obligated only to report informa-
tion of which she has knowledge or reason to know. This suggests a fur-
ther duty to investigate, which is borne out by the courts' interpretation of
the "reason to know" requirement." 17 While the duty to investigate may at
first blush seem unobjectionable, when stated in terms of the deterrence
framework, it is less innocuous: to increase the taxpayer's compliance, the
spouse has a duty to investigate those activities, and to report her findings
to the IRS. The spouse is forced to step into the shoes of an auditor, a role
that is wildly incongruent with the love, intimacy and trust usually associ-
ated with the marital relationship.
118
A second problem with analogizing spousal liability to information
reporting is the magnitude of the penalty imposed on the spouse. While a
bank incurs a $50 penalty for failure to report, the spouse incurs a penalty
equal to the tax liability relating to the information she failed to report,
along with any interest charges and penalties.' 1 9 The spouse's penalty is
seriously disproportionate when compared to the bank's. This becomes
even more apparent when one considers the reporting "requirement"
most comparable to the spouse's: friends, neighbors and co-workers of the
taxpayer are rewarded if they provide information about the taxpayer to
the IRS (the so-called "reward for rats" program); they are not penalized
for failing to do so.1
20
With regard to the duty to pay, the analogy between third-party with-
holding agent and spouse is even more attenuated. Unlike an employer,
the spouse does not have control of amounts paid to the taxpayer and,
thus, does not have the opportunity to withhold before such control is
transferred to the taxpayer. Furthermore, although the spouse may nomi-
nally have some control by reason ofjointly owned assets, the spouse is not
likely to have actual control over amounts earned by the taxpayer.1 21 Fi-
could be carried out by revising the return to reflect her information or by refus-
ing to sign the return.
117. See supra note 21.
118. Cf Malinda L. Seymore, Isn't It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal
Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1032, 1044-52 (1996) (survey-
ing history of spousal immunity).
119. One could argue that a higher penalty must be imposed on the spouse
than on a bank to overcome the spouse's inclination not to harm her husband, but
this argument merely highlights the incongruity of requiring a spouse to inform
on her husband.
120. See I.R.C. § 7623 (2003) (authorizing Secretary to pay sums necessary for
detecting violations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (2003) (authorizing rewards for in-
formation relating to tax code violations). The IRS paid out rewards of $1.8 mil-
lion (on 681 claims) in 1995, $3.4 million (on 669 claims) in 1994 and $5.3 million
(on 829 claims) in 1993. Tom Herman, IRS Rewards to Informants Fell Sharply Last
Year, WAL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1996, at Al. Even on this small scale, at least one
lawmaker has argued that the reward program is a "negative way to collect funds."
Statement of Senator Harry Reid, John C. Bell ed., Congressional Record: May 3-9, 79
TAX NOTES 1015, 1016 (John C. Bell ed., 1998) (quoting Sen. Harry Reid, D-Nev).
121. See Kornhauser, supra note 70, at 105-06 (finding that substantial num-
bers of couples separate some or all of their income).
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nally, even if the spouse did have control, it would.be incongruous with
the marital relationship to impose on her the obligation to set aside funds
for the benefit of the government.
2. Agency Rationales
The agency rationales for vicarious liability add little to the analysis of
traditional relief thus far. A threshold problem is that spouses do not have
a principal/agent relationship with each other, either in the legal sense of
one being controlled by the other or in the economic sense of one con-
tracting with the other. In some instances, an agency relationship has
been found to exist between married persons. 12 2 The marital relation-
ship, however, differs from an agency relationship in significant ways.
There are complex psychological, emotional and financial facets of mar-
riage that are not present in an agency relationship.
12 3
Even assuming that the spouse does control the taxpayer (by report-
ing information about the taxpayer to the IRS or diverting funds for the
payment of taxes), the two rationales for imposing vicarious liability (fair-
ness and deterrence) are problematic for the reasons described above. In
brief, as between the spouse and government, it does not seem fair to
impose the burden of collection on the taxpayer and the risk of his insol-
vency on the spouse. From a deterrence standpoint, imposing a collection
duty on the spouse as a means of achieving greater compliance by the
taxpayer interferes fundamentally with the marital relationship.
3. Fraudulent Conveyance Rationales
There are thematic similarities between fraudulent conveyance laws
and the traditional relief innocent spouse rules. A classic fraudulent trans-
fer might involve a debtor transferring assets to a family member, either as
a gift or without adequate consideration, in order to avoid paying a credi-
tor. Applying this template to spousal tax liability, one could view the tax-
payer (debtor) as transferring assets to a family member (the spouse)
122. See, e.g., In re Tara of North Hills, 116 B.R. 455, 462 (E.D.N.C. 1989),
affd, 904 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that wife acted as agent for husband);
In re Paolino, 89 B.R. 453, 460 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (discussing presumptive
agency relationship between spouses).
123. See Robert B. Chapman, Coverture and Cooperation: The Firm, the Market,
and the Substantive Consolidation of Married Debtors, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 105, 177-80
(2000) (discussing various facets of marital relationship); A. Mechele Dickerson,
To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts?, 78
B.U. L. REv. 961, 965 (1998) (describing marriage as "a relationship involving at
least some level of mutual emotional and economical support"); Steven H.
Resnicoff, Is It Morally Wrong to Depend on the Honesty of Your Partner or Spouse? Bank-
ruptcy Dischargeability of Vicarious Debt, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 147, 205 (1992) (ar-
guing that marital relationship differs from agency relationship in significant ways:
one spouse does not control the other, and there are complex psychological, emo-
tional and financial facets of marriage that do not exist in agency relationship).
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without adequate consideration (as evidenced by significant benefit to the
spouse) in order to avoid paying his creditor (the government).
The parallels exist, but there are differences as well. One important
difference is that fraudulent conveyance law focuses on the fraudulent in-
tent (whether actual or constructive) of the debtor, while the traditional
innocent spouse rules completely disregard the taxpayer's intent. Another
is that a fraudulent conveyance can involve a transfer to anyone-a family
member, friend, another creditor-not just the debtor's spouse. It is be-
yond the scope of this Article to analyze all of the ways in which fraudulent
conveyance law diverges from the traditional innocent spouse rules. Nor
would it be productive to do so, for the Internal Revenue Code has a sepa-
rate fraudulent conveyance statute12 4 and does not need another one in
the guise of innocent spouse relief.
125
In summary, the tort, agency and fraudulent conveyance rationales
for imposing multiple liability do not satisfactorily explain or justify the
traditional innocent spouse rules. Imposing liability on a spouse for an
understatement attributable to her erroneous items is consistent with the
fundamental principle that each individual is responsible for paying tax
on the income arising from her activities. Where the understatement is
attributable to the other spouse, however, liability should not be imposed
on a spouse merely because she knows, or has reason to know, of the un-
derstatement or because she received a significant benefit from the under-
statement. These liability rules under traditional relief should be
repealed.
B. Proportionate Relief
Proportionate relief allocates a deficiency between two spouses in pro-
portion to their respective shares of erroneous items that gave rise to the
deficiency. Under proportionate relief, a spouse is not liable if (1) the
deficiency is allocable to the other spouse in proportion to his erroneous
items; (2) the spouse seeking relief does not have actual knowledge of
these items; and (3) she and the other spouse do not transfer assets to
avoid taxes or engage in fraudulent schemes. 126 Restating these as condi-
tions under which she will be liable, she will be held liable (1) to the ex-
tent the deficiency is allocable to her in proportion to her erroneous
items; or (2) if she had actual knowledge of the other spouse's erroneous
items; or (3) if she and the other spouse sought to avoid taxes or acted
fraudulently.
124. See I.R.C. § 6901 (2003).
125. See Beck, supra note 6, at 402-08 (discussing transferee liability as alterna-
tive to joint liability); Christian I, supra note 6, at 572-78 (advocating transferee
liability as solution to problems with spousal joint liability).
126. A fourth requirement is that the spouse seeking request and the other
spouse are divorced, legally separated or have lived apart for the twelve-month
period preceding the date relief is requested. There is no plausible justification
for this requirement.
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Much of the analysis of the traditional innocent spouse rules in Part
V.A. can be applied here. Thus, the first condition of liability under pro-
portionate relief-under which a spouse is liable to the extent the defi-
ciency is attributable to her erroneous items-underscores each spouse's
distinct identity as a taxpayer and supports the claim that marital unity is a
fiction. In addition, the fairness arguments for imposing liability are not
persuasive in the tax setting, where there is no identifiable victim and
where, to the extent the government is the victim, its ability to absorb loss
and its collection powers vastly outmatch those of the taxpayer's spouse.
Viewed from a deterrence standpoint, the proportionate relief rules
differ from the traditional relief rules in that they impose spousal liability
only if a spouse had actual knowledge of the other spouse's erroneous
items, and not if she had reason to know of those items. In terms of com-
pliance, the proportionate relief rules can be viewed as imposing on the
spouse a duty to report what she knows, but arguably they do not impose
the further duty to investigate. 127 Imposing a duty to report is problem-
atic for the reasons discussed above: such a duty is inconsistent with the
marital relationship and the penalty for failure to do so is disproportion-
ately high.
The third condition for proportionate relief imposes liability if assets
were transferred by the other spouse to the spouse seeking relief with the
principal purpose of tax avoidance, or if one or both spouses acted fraudu-
lently. Like the significant benefit test under traditional relief, this condi-
tion for liability bears a resemblance to fraudulent conveyance law and,
like the significant benefit test, it is unnecessary in view of the Internal
Revenue Code's fraudulent conveyance law.
C. Equitable Relief
Equitable relief is a residual provision, providing relief in situations
where traditional and proportionate relief are not available, but it would
be inequitable to hold the spouse liable. There has been relatively little
interpretation and application of this provision. 128 In determining the
scope of the provision, there is an opportunity to mitigate some of the
problems with traditional and proportionate relief. In addition, the equi-
table relief provision should be interpreted in a manner consistent with a
cohesive theory of the tax treatment of married individuals. There follows
some suggestions along these lines.
127. As discussed above, imposing a further duty to investigate would be even
more objectionable. For this reason, and also in order to comply with the legisla-
tive history, the Treasury Department and courts should interpret the "actual
knowledge" test strictly.
128. Thus far, the Treasury Department has provided guidelines for relief in
the specific situation noted in the legislative history-where an accurate return is
filed but the other spouse fails to pay the reported tax liability-and has provided
a list of factors to be taken into account in determining whether equitable relief
should be available. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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One critical category of relief that remains to be fleshed out is the
situation where traditional and proportionate relief are not available be-
cause the spouse seeking relief had knowledge (or in the case of tradi-
tional relief, reason to know would suffice) of erroneous items of the other
spouse. The Treasury Department has indicated an unwillingness to pro-
vide relief in this situation.1 29 The Tax Court has disagreed in several
cases, substituting its judgment that equitable relief was warranted even if
the spouse had actual knowledge. 130 This Article argues that a spouse's
knowledge or reason to know of the other spouse's erroneous items is not
a justifiable basis on which to impose liability. Accordingly, the Tax
Court's approach is preferable, despite concerns about the Tax Court's
disregard of administrative deference.
Another general category of relief that is likely to be controversial is
the situation where traditional and proportionate relief are not available
because an understatement (or underpayment) is attributable to errone-
ous items of the spouse seeking relief. Again, the Treasury Department
has been reluctant to concede that equitable relief could ever be available,
while the Tax Court reveals a more generous attitude toward taxpayers.
1 3 1
This Article has argued that each individual is responsible for tax liabilities
related to the individual's own activities. That an individual is married
should not change this result. The equitable innocent spouse provision
should be interpreted to preclude relief in this situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principal tax rationale for joint and several liability-marital
unity-is little more than a fiction adopted by lawmakers and scholars in
order to rationalize a political compromise between community property
and common law states. Furthermore, the other, secondary justifications
for joint and several liability are unsatisfactory at best. Nonetheless, with
the fiction of marital unity deeply embedded in our tax system, joint and
several liability for married joint filers is likely to remain the law. While it
can sometimes promote legitimate goals of fairness and efficiency, as an
examination of joint and several liability in tort, agency and fraudulent
conveyance law reveals, it can also produce unjust or irrational results.
Where possible, therefore, the new innocent spouse laws should be inter-
preted and, in some cases, reformed to alleviate these injustices and
irrationalities.
129. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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